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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Plaintiff Raymond Berg appeals the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment to all defendants in this civil rights 
action alleging false arrest and imprisonment based on an 
erroneously issued warrant. We will affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
 
I. Background 
 
On July 14, 1994, Richard Gardner, the supervisor at 
Allegheny County Adult Probation Services, requested an 
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arrest warrant for Paul Banks, who had violated conditions 
of his parole. After a judge of the Court of Common Pleas 
approved the warrant, Gardner sent an Arrest Warrant 
Information Sheet to Virginia Demko, the warrant clerk 
responsible for issuing and clearing all arrest warrants in 
Allegheny County. The Information Sheet listed Banks's 
name, offense, date of birth, criminal complaint number, 
Social Security number, and address. On August 3, 1994, 
Demko generated the warrant using the County's 
computerized Integrated Court Information System (ICIS). 
ICIS is operated by typing a criminal complaint number 
into the computer, which automatically retrieves the 
remaining information and displays it on the user's screen. 
 
Unfortunately, Demko transposed two digits in Banks' 
criminal complaint number. As a result, she entered the 
criminal complaint number of plaintiff, Raymond A. Berg, 
Jr., who three years earlier had completed a six-month 
parole term for driving under the influence. Demko's 
computer screen displayed Berg's name, date of birth, 
criminal complaint number, Social Security number, and 
address, all of which were different from the information on 
the Arrest Warrant Information Sheet. Berg concedes, 
however, that Demko noticed only that the address on the 
screen was different from the address on the Information 
Sheet. See Appellant's Br. at 7. She did not realize that the 
other information was different as well. See id.  
 
Concluding that the ICIS contained an old or otherwise 
incorrect address for Banks, Demko manually changed the 
information in the ICIS. She replaced Berg's address, in 
Sewickley, Pennsylvania, with Banks's last known address, 
listed on the Information Sheet, in Finleyville, Pennsylvania. 
That was the only change she made. 
 
Demko then generated the warrant for Berg's arrest and 
sent it to the Allegheny County Sheriff 's Office. Gardner's 
name and telephone number were written on the warrant 
as the contact person from whom additional information 
could be obtained. Demko also returned the Information 
Sheet requesting the Banks warrant to Gardner after date- 
stamping it to indicate that the warrant had been issued. 
Thus, because of Demko's clerical error, and her 
subsequent decision to change the information contained in 
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the ICIS, an arrest warrant was issued for Berg rather than 
Banks. Demko later testified in her deposition that, in 
issuing over 500 warrants per month since 1989,"this is 
the only occasion where this has ever occurred." 
 
In reviewing Banks' case on August 16, 1994, Gardner 
noticed that the Information Sheet had been stamped 
(indicating the issuance of a warrant) but, according to his 
review of ICIS, no warrant in fact existed. Gardner admits 
that, "for a brief moment," he may have  considered the 
possibility that an erroneous warrant was issued, but 
would have quickly realized that there was no practical way 
to determine whether one had. See Gardner Dep. at 141:16 
through 142:3 (A.397-98). He then called Demko, informed 
her that no warrant had been issued for Banks, and 
requested that she issue one. Nothing in the record 
indicates that Gardner suggested to Demko, at that time, 
that she may have processed an erroneous warrant. 
 
Berg's warrant was executed on the night of December 
30, 1994, by Glenn Allen Wolfgang, an elected constable in 
Westmoreland County. Wolfgang, who earned a fee for each 
person arrested, frequently executed outstanding arrest 
warrants for Allegheny County, and on December 30 he 
planned to make four arrests. Before leaving home, 
Wolfgang retrieved Berg's address and telephone number 
using a computer software/on-line system he had 
purchased from a credit union. Apparently, however, he did 
not notice that the address he retrieved, and the one listed 
on the warrant for Berg's arrest, were different. He 
proceeded instead to the Finleyville address listed on the 
warrant, only to discover that it was an abandoned house. 
Wolfgang then telephoned Berg and asked for directions to 
his house. Wolfgang called three or four more times for 
further directions and took over an hour to drive from 
Finleyville to Berg's house. In his deposition, Wolfgang 
described Berg as "[v]ery cooperative" on the telephone. 
 
When Wolfgang arrived, Berg was entertaining guests at 
his house at a pre-New Year's Eve party. Berg informed 
Wolfgang that he had never lived in Finleyville and offered 
to produce release documents proving that he was no 
longer on parole. After confirming that Berg's birthday and 
social security number were the same as those on the 
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warrant, Wolfgang refused to look at the release 
documents, instead telling Berg to bring them with him. 
Berg did show Wolfgang his driver's license, confirming that 
Berg was no longer on parole.1 But Wolfgang simply told 
Berg not to take too much time retrieving the release 
documents because he had three more people to arrest that 
night. 
 
Wolfgang did call the Allegheny County Sheriff 's Office, 
but after being told that the warrant was still"active," he 
arrested Berg. Wolfgang did not try to call Gardner. 
Gardner testified that if Wolfgang had called and asked him 
about a warrant for Berg's arrest, Gardner would have 
checked Berg's file and told Wolfgang not to arrest Berg. 
 
At the Sheriff 's office, Berg was strip-searched, 
fingerprinted, inoculated, and placed in the Allegheny 
County Jail. Because Probation Services and the courts 
were closed for the holidays, Berg remained in jail until 
January 3, 1995, or approximately five days. Finally, after 
intervention by Berg's attorney, Demko issued a Notification 
to Clear the Warrant and Berg was released. 
 
Berg filed suit against Allegheny County, Gardner, 
Demko, and Wolfgang in Pennsylvania state court, alleging 
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1985(3), 
1988 (1994), and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth  
Amendments.2 The defendants removed the case to the 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and, 
following discovery, moved for summary judgment. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to all 
defendants, ruling that Berg's arrest was not 
unconstitutional because the facially valid warrant gave 
Wolfgang probable cause for the arrest. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In his deposition, Wolfgang acknowledged knowing that during "the 
penalty phase" of a DUI sentence a defendant must surrender his 
driver's license. 
 
2. Berg also sued his former parole officer, Debbie Benton, and Allegheny 
County Adult Probation Services. Benton was dismissed with Berg's 
consent when it became clear that she was not involved in his arrest. 
The District Court dismissed the Probation Services office, concluding 
the office is an arm of the County without distinct legal existence. See 
Berg v. County of Allegheny, No. 97-928, slip op. at 4 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 
23, 1998). Berg does not challenge this determination on appeal. 
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II. Legal/Analytical Framework 
 
On appeal, Berg presses only his S 1983 claim. 3 To make 
a prima facie case under S 1983, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a person acting under color of law 
deprived him of a federal right. See Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, it is 
undisputed that defendants were acting under color of law 
when they issued and executed the warrant for Berg's 
arrest. 
 
The next step is to "identify the exact contours of the 
underlying right said to have been violated." County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). Section 
1983 is not a source of substantive rights and does not 
provide redress for common law torts--the plaintiff must 
allege a violation of a federal right. See Baker v. McCollan, 
443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). Berg alleges he was subjected to 
false arrest, false imprisonment, and denial of due process 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1985(3), and the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that when government 
behavior is governed by a specific constitutional 
amendment, due process analysis is inappropriate. 
Although not all actions by police officers are governed by 
the Fourth Amendment, see Lewis at 842-43 (noting that 
accidents during police chases are not "covered" by the 
Fourth Amendment), the constitutionality of arrests by 
state officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather 
than due process analysis. See id.; United States v. Lanier, 
520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 
386, 394 (1989); Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 302 (5th 
Cir. 1994). Therefore, we will limit our analysis of Berg's 
arrest to his Fourth Amendment claim. See Baker , 443 U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 provides in part: 
 
       Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, 
       custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
       Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
       United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the 
       deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
       Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
       action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
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at 142-43 (1979) (interpreting S 1983 false imprisonment 
claim as grounded in Fourth Amendment rights); Groman, 
47 F.3d at 636 (same). Although we recognize the 
possibility that some false arrest claims might be subject to 
a due process analysis, we also conclude that this record 
could not support a due process claim. 
 
Our analysis of Berg's Fourth Amendment claim is a 
three-step process. First, we must determine whether he 
was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. If so, we next 
determine whether that seizure violated the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. 
Finally, if there has been a Fourth Amendment violation, we 
must determine which of the defendants, if any, may be 
held liable for it. 
 
III. Fourth Amendment Seizures 
 
A person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes only 
if he is detained by means intentionally applied to 
terminate his freedom of movement. A seizure occurs even 
when an unintended person is the object of detention, so 
long as the means of detention are intentionally applied to 
that person. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
596 (1989) (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-05 
(1971)); see also Medeiros v. O'Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 169 
(2d Cir. 1998); Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 
281 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1097 (1992); 
Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 
1990). 
 
For example, if a police officer fires his gun at a fleeing 
robbery suspect and the bullet inadvertently strikes an 
innocent bystander, there has been no Fourth Amendment 
seizure. See Medeiros, 150 F.3d at 168-69; Rucker, 946 
F.2d at 281; Landol-Rivera, 906 F.2d at 795. If, on the 
other hand, the officer fires his gun directly at the innocent 
bystander in the mistaken belief that the bystander is the 
robber, then a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. 
See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (citing Hill v. California, 401 
U.S. 797, 802-05 (1971)). 
 
Applying that law to these facts, there is no doubt that 
Berg's arrest constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment 
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purposes. Even if Wolfgang had thought he was arresting 
Banks, his intentional application of control over the 
person of Berg would be a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
Here, however, Wolfgang knew he was arresting Berg rather 
than Banks, and clearly intended to do so, even though 
motivated by an erroneous warrant. The question, then, is 
whether the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits arrests without 
probable cause. See Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 
F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). As previously noted, the 
District Court concluded that the warrant for Berg's arrest 
was facially valid and that it therefore supplied probable 
cause to arrest him. See Berg v. County of Allegheny, No. 
97-928, slip op. at 4-7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1998) (Wolfgang); 
Berg v. County of Allegheny, No. 97-928, slip op. at 4-5 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1998) (remaining defendants). We 
cannot agree. 
 
The Supreme Court's decision in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 
U.S. 560 (1971), as well as our own subsequent decisions, 
make clear that an erroneously issued warrant cannot 
provide probable cause for an arrest. In Whiteley, a county 
sheriff obtained a warrant for Whiteley's arrest based on a 
conclusory complaint. Police officers in another jurisdiction 
arrested Whiteley, discovering evidence later introduced at 
his trial. The state argued that because the arresting 
officers were unaware of the defect in the warrant, they had 
probable cause to arrest whether or not the sheriff did. But 
the Supreme Court held that the arrest was 
unconstitutional and ordered the evidence excluded: 
 
       Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers 
       in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume 
       that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate 
       the information requisite to support an independent 
       judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however, 
       the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal 
       arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the 
       decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow 
       officers to make the arrest. 
 
Id. at 568. As in Whiteley, Constable Wolfgang relied on an 
arrest warrant, assuming it had been issued after 
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presentation to a judge of evidence sufficient to establish 
probable cause.4 Also as in Whiteley, "the contrary turn[ed] 
out to be true"; neither Gardner, Demko, nor anyone else 
associated with the creation of the warrant had probable 
cause to arrest Berg. 
 
In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), the 
Court, relying primarily on Whiteley, held that police may 
conduct a Terry stop based on a flyer issued by other 
officers, but "[i]f the flyer has been issued in the absence of 
a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective reliance 
upon it violates the Fourth Amendment." Id.  at 232. In 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), the Court held that 
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule do not require 
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an erroneous 
warrant resulting from a clerical error. But the Court also 
noted that Whiteley "clearly retains relevance in 
determining whether police officers have violated the Fourth 
Amendment." Id. at 13. Thus, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that a mistakenly issued or executed warrant cannot 
provide probable cause for an arrest. 
 
Our cases have applied the same principle. In Rogers v. 
Powell, 120 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1997), a county probation 
officer told one state trooper that a second state trooper 
had reported that a warrant existed for Roger's arrest. 
Relying on the probation officer's representation that a 
warrant existed, the first state trooper arrested Rogers the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, without discussion of 
Whiteley, has upheld an arrest based on a warrant later found to have 
been improperly issued. See United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 884- 
85 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989); see also United 
States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1505 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a Terry stop based on good-faith reliance on 
inaccurate information provided by other law enforcement officials); 
United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) (per curiam) (same). Other courts, relying on Whiteley, have 
continued to hold that an improperly issued warrant cannot provide 
probable cause for an arrest. See United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 
193-94 & 194 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); Ott v. State , 600 A.2d 111, 115 (Md. 
1992); State v. Taylor, 621 A.2d 1252, 1254 (R.I. 1993). The Supreme 
Court's subsequent decisions, as well as our own, convince us that 
Whiteley remains the governing law. 
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following day. In fact, however, there was no such warrant 
and Rogers filed a S 1983 action for violation of his Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
 
Like defendants here, the Rogers defendants argued that 
the arresting officer's "mistaken belief that an arrest 
warrant had issued for Rogers supplied the probable cause 
required by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 452-53. We 
rejected this argument, holding that "[t]he legality of a 
seizure based solely on statements issued by fellow officers 
depends on whether the officers who issued the statements 
possessed the requisite basis to seize the suspect." Id. at 
453 (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231). Because "neither [the 
trooper] nor [the probation officer] had knowledge of the 
requisite facts and circumstances necessary to support a 
finding of probable cause," we concluded the arrest violated 
the Fourth Amendment. Id. We similarly rejected the 
argument that reliance on a mistakenly issued warrant can 
supply probable cause in United States v. Miles , 468 F.2d 
482, 487-88 (3d Cir. 1972), and United States v. Bianco, 
189 F.2d 716, 719 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 
The only potentially distinguishing feature of Berg's 
arrest is that the mistake here was made by a court clerk, 
rather than a police officer. We do not believe this 
distinction is significant, however. The Fourth Amendment 
provides: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Because the courts are 
the arm of government charged with issuing warrants, we 
believe this requirement is directed to court officials as well 
as law enforcement officers. This reading is supported by 
the case law. In Arizona v. Evans, the Supreme Court did 
not find it significant that the unlawful arrest was 
occasioned by the mistake of court clerk, as opposed to a 
police officer. See 514 U.S. at 13-15. 5 Similarly, in Rogers, 
the arresting officers relied on a probation officer's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Court did recognize that court personnel are not "adjuncts to the 
law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime" and therefore application of the exclusionary rule is 
unlikely to alter their behavior. Id. at 15. But this determination is not 
relevant to an assessment of whether their mistakes can provide 
probable cause for an arrest. 
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statement that another trooper had said a warrant existed 
for Rogers' arrest, yet we held the arrest unconstitutional 
without inquiring whether the mistake was the trooper's or 
the probation officer's. See 120 F.3d at 452-55; see also 
Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 
1980) (holding that although it was unclear whether the 
police department or clerk's office had failed to transmit an 
order quashing a warrant, "[i]t seems clear that [plaintiff] 
sustained a violation of constitutional rights by being 
arrested and detained pursuant to an invalid warrant"). 
 
Because the government officials who issued the warrant 
here did not have probable cause to arrest Berg, the arrest 
violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, summary 
judgment should not have been granted based on the 
existence of the warrant.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Unlike defendants, we do not read Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 
(1979) to hold otherwise. When he was arrested, McCollan's brother 
claimed to be McCollan, presenting McCollan's identification. After his 
brother violated parole, McCollan was arrested on a warrant and spent 
a long New Year's weekend in jail. The Court found no constitutional 
violation, but the substance of McCollan's claim was different from 
Berg's: 
 
       [R]espondent makes clear that his S 1983 claim was based solely on 
       Sheriff Baker's actions after respondent was incarcerated . . . . 
 
        . . . Absent an attack on the validity of the warrant under which 
       he was arrested, respondent's complaint is simply that despite his 
       protests of mistaken identity, he was detained [over the long 
       weekend]. Whatever claims this situation might give rise to under 
       state tort law, we think it gives rise to no claim under the United 
       States Constitution. 
 
Id. at 143-44. Unlike McCollan, Berg challenges the generation and 
execution of the warrant for his arrest, not the decision to incarcerate 
him after arrest. At issue here is not whether authorities must 
investigate the claims of innocence of a person who has been legally 
arrested but what precautions the Constitution requires before an arrest 
warrant is issued and executed. See Murray, 634 F.2d at 367 
(distinguishing Baker on the same ground). 
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IV. Liability of the Individual Defendants  
 
Absent immunity or an adequate defense, a person who, 
acting under color of state law, directly and intentionally 
applies the means by which another is seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment can be held liable under S 1983. As 
a general rule, a government official's liability for causing 
an arrest is the same as for carrying it out. See Gordon v. 
Degelmann, 29 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1994); see also 
Kilborn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 200 (1880) (holding 
that legislators directing an arrest are as responsible as 
those who effected arrest). As the Supreme Court has 
explained, S 1983 anticipates that an individual will be 
"responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (holding that 
a police officer who obtains an arrest warrant without 
probable cause is liable under S 1983 even though another 
officer made the actual arrest). It is thus clear that S 1983 
liability for an unlawful arrest can extend beyond the 
arresting officer to other officials whose intentional actions 
set the arresting officer in motion. We turn, then, to the 
issue of which, if any, of the defendants in this case can be 
held liable for Berg's unconstitutional arrest. 
 
A. Constable Wolfgang 
 
Constable Wolfgang contends that he is entitled to 
qualified immunity from suit because he executed a facially 
valid warrant. Unless historical facts are in dispute, 
qualified immunity is a matter for the court. See id. at 828. 
The inquiry is an objective one; the arresting officer's 
subjective beliefs about the existence of probable cause are 
not relevant. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 
(1987). In considering claims of qualified immunity, courts 
are sensitive to "[t]he broad range of reasonable 
professional judgment accorded" law enforcement officials 
in the S 1983 context. Greene v. Reeves , 80 F.3d 1101, 
1107 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, "the qualified immunity 
doctrine `gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by 
protecting `all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.' " Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484 (quoting 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986)). 
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A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if 
his "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982). In the context of this case, the question is whether 
"a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her 
conduct was lawful, in light of the clearly established law 
and the information in the officer's possession." Sharrar v. 
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Hunter v. 
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam); Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Our inquiry, then, has 
two parts. Did Wolfgang's conduct violate clearly 
established law? If so, did he nevertheless reasonably 
believe that his conduct was lawful in light of the 
information he possessed at the time? 
 
At the time of Berg's arrest in 1994, it was clear that an 
arrest could be made only with probable cause. Although 
Rogers was decided in 1997, Whiteley clearly established in 
1971 the conditions under which an arresting officer can 
obtain probable cause from a warrant. As we have already 
noted, the warrant at issue in this case did not provide 
probable cause to arrest Berg. Therefore, we must consider 
whether a reasonable constable in Wolfgang's position 
could have concluded that there was probable cause to 
arrest Berg based on the information Wolfgang had at the 
time. 
 
Ordinarily, it is reasonable for an officer to assume that 
a warrant has been issued for probable cause. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Baker, 
 
       Given the requirements that arrest be made only on 
       probable cause and that one detained be accorded a 
       speedy trial, we do not think a sheriff executing an 
       arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to 
       investigate independently every claim of innocence, 
       whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a 
       defense such as lack of requisite intent. 
 
443 U.S. at 145-46. Therefore, we have generally extended 
immunity to an officer who makes an arrest based on an 
objectively reasonable belief that there is a valid warrant. 
See Rogers, 120 F.3d at 456 (concluding that a state 
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trooper who was inaccurately told by another trooper that 
there was a warrant for the plaintiff 's arrest was immune 
from suit); Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (holding that arresting officers were immune in 
light of a bulletin correctly reporting the existence of an 
arrest warrant "as well as the nature of the alleged offenses 
[including child kidnaping] and the fact that a young child 
was in possible danger"); cf. Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming 
summary judgment in favor of officers who arrested plaintiff 
after being told by another officer that plaintiff had 
assaulted her). Other courts of appeals have adopted the 
same rule. See Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 
(11th Cir. 1995); Salmon v. Schwartz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1140- 
41 (10th Cir. 1991); Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 
883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 1989); Barr v. Abrams, 810 
F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1987). But see Ruehman v. Sheahan, 
34 F.3d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 1994) (dicta) (questioning 
whether officers who arrested plaintiff based on an 
inaccurate computer report of an outstanding warrant were 
protected by qualified immunity). 
 
Nevertheless, an apparently valid warrant does not 
render an officer immune from suit if his reliance on it is 
unreasonable in light of the relevant circumstances. Such 
circumstances include, but are not limited to, other 
information that the officer possesses or to which he has 
reasonable access, and whether failing to make an 
immediate arrest creates a public threat or danger of flight. 
See Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 (holding that where a police 
office submits an affidavit in support of a warrant request, 
and a reviewing magistrate's concludes that the affidavit 
establishes probable cause, the officer is not immune from 
a S 1983 lawsuit if "a reasonably well-trained officer in 
petitioner's position would have known that his affidavit 
failed to establish probable cause . . . ."); see also Yancey 
v. Carroll County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that "[p]olice officers are entitled to rely on a 
judicially secured warrant for immunity from a S 1983 
action for illegal search and seizure unless the warrant is 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause, that official belief in 
the existence of probable cause is unreasonable."). 
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At the summary judgment stage here, Berg submitted a 
report from Alan Springer, a Pennsylvania Constable, who 
concluded "it was not objectively reasonable for Mr. 
Wolfgang to believe that probable cause existed for the 
arrest of Mr. Berg" under the circumstances. According to 
Springer, the relevant circumstances included the age of 
the warrant, the invalid address, Berg's socio-economic 
status, Berg's documentation that he had completed his 
probation, Berg's cooperativeness, the fact that Berg had a 
driver's license despite allegedly being on parole for DUI, 
the fact that Berg did not flee or ask his guests to leave 
despite having ample warning of Wolfgang's arrival, and the 
nonviolent nature of the crime. Springer stated that 
Wolfgang should have waited until the probation office re- 
opened on January 3, 1995 so he could look into Berg's 
claims. He also opined that Wolfgang had been 
"predisposed to arrest Mr. Berg" to earn his fee, particularly 
after such a large investment of time. 
 
We think Springer's report raises valid questions 
concerning the reasonableness of Wolfgang's conduct in 
this case. Because the District Court concluded that Berg's 
arrest had not been unconstitutional, it did not reach 
Wolfgang's qualified immunity claim. Consequently, it did 
not make the findings of fact necessary to determine, as a 
mater of law, whether Wolfgang's reliance on the warrant 
was unreasonable under the circumstances with which he 
was confronted. Therefore, we will remand the cause so 
that the District Court can make the necessary findings, 
and can consider the qualified immunity issue in the first 
instance. 
 
B. Demko 
 
To avoid summary judgment under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis, Berg must point to some evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Demko intentionally 
caused his arrest. He has failed to do so. In fact, Berg 
concedes that Demko failed to notice that her computer 
screen displayed his name, rather than Banks', when she 
mistakenly transposed the criminal complaint number on 
the Warrant Information Request Sheet. See Appellant's Br. 
at 7 ("She also failed to note that all of the other 
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information on her computer screen, i.e. the arrestee's 
name, his date of birth, his criminal complaint number, his 
social security number and the reason for his arrest, was 
also incorrect."). Nevertheless, Berg contends that Demko 
could be held liable under a due process theory of 
deliberate indifference. 
 
Where a defendant does not intentionally cause the 
plaintiff to be seized, but is nonetheless responsible for the 
seizure, it may be that a due process "deliberate 
indifference" rather than a Fourth Amendment analysis is 
appropriate. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 
823, 843-44 (1998) (holding that if there is no seizure, the 
case is not covered by the Fourth Amendment and therefore 
due process analysis may be appropriate). We need not 
decide that here, however, because Berg has not alleged 
anything more than mere negligence on Demko's part. 
Negligence by public officials is not actionable as a due 
process violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 
(1986); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 
(3d Cir. 1991). Whether or not she should have noticed the 
additional discrepancies between the information displayed 
on her computer screen and what appeared on the 
Information sheet, the fact remains that she did not. 
 
Berg claims, however, that Demko acted with deliberate 
indifference because she failed to take any steps to recall 
the erroneously issued warrant when Gardner "informed 
her of [her mistake] on August 16, 1994." Appellant's Br. at 
25. The record does not support Berg's argument. When 
Gardner called Demko on August 16, he merely informed 
her that no warrant for Banks had been issued. See 
Gardner Dep. at 116:9-14 (App. 372). He did not inform her 
that she had issued an erroneous warrant until 
approximately January 3, 1995, several days after Berg had 
been arrested. See Appellant's Br. at 11 (citing App. 603). 
By that time, it was obviously too late to recall the warrant 
before it was executed. There is nothing in the record 
indicating that Demko was aware of her error at any earlier 
date. She could not have been deliberately indifferent to a 
risk of which she was reasonably unaware. Therefore, we 
will affirm summary judgment in favor of Demko. 
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C. Gardner 
 
As with Demko, Berg points to no record evidence that 
Gardner intentionally caused his arrest. Though Gardner 
initiated the series of events that ultimately led to Berg's 
arrest, his only role was to request a warrant for Banks. He 
played no part in issuing the erroneous warrant for Berg. 
Neither did he play any part in Wolfgang's execution of that 
warrant. In short, there is nothing in this record suggesting 
that Gardner ever intended to cause Berg's arrest. His only 
intention was to cause Banks' arrest. 
 
By way of rough analogy, Gardner's warrant request is 
analogous to the stray bullets at issue in Medeiros, Rucker, 
and Landol-Rivera. Gardner "fired" the warrant at Banks, 
and it inadvertently "struck" Berg instead. This is not the 
intentional application of the means of detention required 
for a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
 
Again, however, Berg argues that Gardner could be held 
liable under a due process theory of deliberate indifference. 
He contends that Gardner displayed such indifference when 
he failed "to act on his `hunch' that perhaps an erroneous 
warrant did, in fact, issue." Appellant's Br. at 8. It is worth 
noting, however, that the record does not establish any 
such "hunch" on Gardner's part. Asked at deposition to 
recall his thoughts on a particular day more than three 
years in the past, Gardner was only willing to assume that: 
 
       based upon the way I try and perform my job, that it 
       occurred to me that the warrant-- there was no 
       warrant issued, that the warrant may have not taken 
       in the computer or that there was a possibility that a 
       bad warrant had been issued. 
 
Gardner Dep. at 151:16-20 (A.407); see also id.  at 140:4-8 
(A.396). 
 
Even assuming, for summary judgment purposes, that 
Gardner did realize a bad warrant may have issued, his 
uncontradicted testimony establishes that he believed there 
was simply no reasonable way to investigate his suspicion. 
While the term deliberate indifference is generally defined to 
require only knowledge of a serious risk of harm, see 
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 345 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) 
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(defining deliberate indifference in the context of a 
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim), it also implies a 
failure to take reasonably available measures to reduce or 
eliminate that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
847 (1994) (holding that "a prison official may be held liable 
under the Eighth Amendment . . . only if he knows that 
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures 
to abate it.") (emphasis added). Where no reasonable 
measures exist, neither can deliberate indifference. As with 
Demko, we will affirm summary judgment in favor of 
Gardner. 
 
V. Municipal Liability 
 
Allegheny County cannot be held liable for the 
unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of 
respondeat superior. See Monell v. Department of Social 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, Berg must 
demonstrate that the violation of his rights was caused by 
either a policy or a custom of the municipality. See Beck v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Berg contends that he was arrested as a result of 
Allegheny County's "flawed warrant creation practice" and 
poor training procedures. As noted, the Integrated Court 
Information System generates a warrant based on a single 
datum -- the criminal complaint number of the person to 
be arrested. Because the user enters no other information, 
there is no check in the computer system to guard against 
the kind of mistake Demko made. Nor are there procedures 
that would allow a probation officer such as Gardner who 
suspects an error to confirm that suspicion. Theseflaws, 
Berg maintains, caused his unlawful arrest. 
 
"Policy is made when a `decisionmaker possess[ing] final 
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the 
action' issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict." 
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 
(1986) (plurality opinion)) (alteration in original, other 
internal quotation marks omitted). Customs are " `practices 
of state officials . . . so permanent and well settled' as to 
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virtually constitute law." Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 
691) (other internal quotation marks omitted). Both Demko 
and Gardner made it clear that there is an established and 
predictable procedure for issuing warrants and the County 
has not claimed that the method used in Berg's case 
differed from any other -- apart from the obvious 
aberration. To the contrary, in its answer to the complaint, 
the County conceded that Demko "followed the practices 
and procedures which had been in effect at the time she 
started working." Answer, P 8. We believe it is a more than 
reasonable inference to suppose that a system responsible 
for issuing 6,000 warrants a year would be the product of 
a decision maker's action or acquiescence. See, e.g., Beck, 
89 F.3d at 973 ("written complaints were sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to infer that Chief of Police of Pittsburgh 
and his department knew or should have known" of officer's 
violent behavior); Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 
1997) (stating custom is demonstrated by showing"practice 
is so well settled and widespread that the policymaking 
officials have either actual or constructive knowledge of it"). 
Thus, we hold that there is sufficient evidence that the 
procedure was a policy or custom of the County's. 
 
Once a S 1983 plaintiff identifies a municipal policy or 
custom, he must "demonstrate that, through its deliberate 
conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the 
injury alleged." Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County 
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). If, as here, the policy 
or custom does not facially violate federal law, causation 
can be established only by "demonstrat[ing] that the 
municipal action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as 
to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of simple 
or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Id. at 407 
(citations omitted); see also City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 
489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). 
 
Failure to adequately screen or train municipal 
employees can ordinarily be considered deliberate 
indifference only where the failure has caused a pattern of 
violations. See Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 408-09. Although 
it is possible to maintain a claim of failure to train without 
demonstrating such a pattern, the Bryan County  Court 
made clear that the burden on the plaintiff in such a case 
is high: 
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       In leaving open in Canton the possibility that a plaintiff 
       might succeed in carrying a failure-to-train claim 
       without showing a pattern of constitutional violations, 
       we simply hypothesized that, in a narrow range of 
       circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a 
       highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law 
       enforcement officers with specific tools to handle 
       recurring situations. The likelihood that the situation 
       will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking 
       specific tools to handle that situation will violate 
       citizens' rights could justify a finding that 
       policymakers' decision not to train the officer reflected 
       "deliberate indifference" to the obvious consequence of 
       the policymakers' choice. 
 
Id. at 409. The Court has stated that an example of 
deliberate indifference to an obvious risk is arming officers 
without training them "in the constitutional limitations on 
the use [of the arms.]" Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. 
 
Berg contends the County is liable because of its failure 
to provide sufficient procedural or technical safeguards 
against errors such as the one that resulted in Berg's 
arrest. We have previously applied the Supreme Court's 
rulings in failure-to-train cases to other claims of liability 
through inaction, see, e.g., Beck, 89 F.3d at 972; Williams 
v. Borough of West Chester Pennsylvania, 891 F.2d 458, 
467 n. 14 (3d Cir. 1989), and we do so here as well. 
 
The record contains no evidence of procedures guarding 
against Demko's mistake. Expressing considerable 
knowledge of the warrant-issuing procedures, Gardner 
testified that he knew of no "double check" to ensure that 
warrants were issued in the correct name. Nor was Gardner 
aware of any procedure by which he could check to 
ascertain if an erroneous warrant had issued. Having 
employed a design where the slip of a finger could result in 
wrongful arrest and imprisonment, there remains an issue 
of fact whether the County was deliberately indifferent to an 
obvious risk. The County's failure to provide protective 
measures and failsafes against Demko's mistake seems 
comparable to "a failure to equip law enforcement officers 
with specific tools to handle recurring situations." Bryan 
County, 520 U.S. at 409. When such a simple mistake can 
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so obviously lead to a constitutional violation, we cannot 
hold that the municipality was not deliberately indifferent 
to the risk as a matter of law. Accordingly, the County may 
be liable under Monell. 
 
We will reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment to the County so that a fact finder may address 
these questions.7 
 
VI. Future Violations 
 
It is clear we have entered an age in which law 
enforcement personnel will rely increasingly on computer 
technology. Dissenting in Arizona v. Evans, Justice 
Ginsburg noted, 
 
       Widespread reliance on computers to store and convey 
       information generates, along with manifold benefits, 
       new possibilities of error, due to both computer 
       malfunctions and operator mistakes. . . . 
       [C]omputerization greatly amplifies an error's effect, 
       and correspondingly intensifies the need for prompt 
       correction; for inaccurate data can infect not only one 
       agency, but the many agencies that share access to the 
       database. 
 
514 U.S. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice 
O'Connor emphasized, 
 
       In recent years, we have witnessed the advent of 
       powerful, computer-based recordkeeping systems that 
       facilitate arrests in ways that have never before been 
       possible. The police, of course, are entitled to enjoy the 
       substantial advantages this technology confers. They 
       may not, however, rely on it blindly. With the benefits 
       of more efficient law enforcement mechanisms comes 
       the burden of corresponding constitutional 
       responsibilities. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Demko and Gardner intended to arrest Banks. But the County 
intended that the individuals identified by the warrant-issuing system be 
arrested. In this case, the person was Berg. Thus the County 
intentionally seized Berg through means it intentionally applied. 
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Id. at 17-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring). We would add that 
widespread computerization carries with it the ability and 
responsibility to institute more effective safeguards against 
human error than existed in the past. 
 
The Bryan County Court noted that no pattern of 
violations would be necessary to show deliberate 
indifference where it was obvious that a policy or custom 
would lead to constitutional violations. What is obvious in 
the field of technology is determined under an evolving 
standard. In this case, Allegheny County may have been 
liable for Raymond Berg's arrest through deliberate 
indifference to the obvious danger of such an arrest. 
Whether or not Allegheny County is ultimately found to 
have been deliberately indifferent in this case, this tragedy 
will never again be novel. Allegheny County is on notice of 
ICIS's shortcomings and at least one of the dangers of 
using compartmentalized computer systems without viable 
failsafes. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
For the reasons given, the judgment of the District Court 
will be affirmed as to Defendants Gardner and Demko and 
reversed as to Defendants Wolfgang and Allegheny County. 
We will remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
 
I respectfully concur in all parts of the court's opinion 
except Part IV. In Part IV, I differ only with respect to 
defendants Demko and Gardner, which the majority 
addresses in subparts B and C, respectively. I would 
reverse this portion of the District Court's summary 
judgment and remand because, in my view, there remains 
a genuine issue of material fact as to each of these 
defendants. 
 
I take issue with the court's conclusion that Demko did 
not intend to cause Berg's seizure. First, Demko's state of 
mind at the time she processed the warrant is not clear on 
this record. Demko's statement that "Berg and Bank, I'm 
sorry, looked very close to me," could be read in two 
different ways. She could have meant that the name"Berg" 
looked so similar to the name "Banks" that she did not 
notice the wrong name was on the screen. Alternatively, she 
could have meant that she knew Berg's name appeared on 
the screen rather than Banks', but assumed the error was 
in the warrant request, not the computer system. In other 
words, Demko could have concluded that Gardner had 
intended to request a warrant for Berg, but inadvertently 
wrote down Banks' name instead. Thus, Demko's state of 
mind remains a jury question. 
 
In addition, even if we assume that Demko did not notice 
discrepancies between the information displayed on the 
screen and what appeared on the information sheet at the 
time she typed in th 
